4 latter is a difference equation linking the change in the exchange rate and the gap between foreign and domestic interest rates:
where e is the log of the exchange rate (defined as the foreign currency units per domestic currency unit), and I * and I are the foreign and domestic interest rates. The UIP condition can be solved forward to yield:
which expresses the exchange rate at time t as the sum of current and expected future interest rate differentials, plus the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, . Domestic interest rates in excess of the foreign are associated with a high-but falling-exchange rate.
While interest rate differentials govern short-run exchange rate dynamics, the (log) ratio of foreign to domestic price levels pin down the long-run exchange rate, , via PPP:
where p * and p are the logs of the foreign and domestic price levels. The condition can also be expressed in terms of the sum of expected future inflation rates:
The PPP and UIP conditions by themselves obviously do not represent a complete macroeconomic model. But even without closing the model, the two conditions suggest a tradeoff between short-run and long-run exchange stabilization.
To see this, imagine an economy subject to supply shocks-events that presented the central bank with a tradeoff between output and inflation stabilization. A vigorous policy reaction will reduce the shocks' impact on the price level, mitigating their long-run effect on the exchange rate.
But such a policy will create larger interest rate differentials, which, in the near term, will generate exchange rate volatility. A more accommodative policy response, on the other hand, reduces shortrun interest-rate induced volatility, but at the expense of destabilizing the long-run value of the 5 exchange rate. Either way, inflation shocks generate exchange rate volatility; how much will depend, of course, on the specifics of the macro model.
One way to close the model is to append the PPP and UIP relations to the model of Svensson (1997) , as extended by Kuttner and Posen (1999) . This model is far too stylized to think about directly estimating. It nonetheless illustrates the theoretical reasoning behind a role for central bank transparency in minimizing the effects of inflation shocks on the exchange rate.
In Svensson's model, the policymaker chooses inflation to minimize the discounted sum of single-period loss functions of the form, subject to an aggregate supply relation given by where y is the output gap, B is inflation, and 8 is the relative weight on output versus inflation stabilization. Persistence is introduced through the Dy t-1 term in the supply equation. Solving the minimization problem yields policy rules giving inflation as a function of expected inflation, the lagged output gap, and the supply shock, ,. An IS equation, is then used to determine the corresponding path of interest rates.
Under discretion, the monetary authority accommodates supply shocks by allowing them to affect inflation: . Not surprisingly, a higher weight on output stabilization implies a more accommodative policy, which in this context means a larger value of b. Expected inflation itself obeys ; if the central bank targets a nonzero output gap, inflation will contain a constant inflation bias, a; output gap fluctuations also create a state contingent inflation bias, cy t . The higher the weight on output stabilization, the larger are a and c.
Having derived the behavior of inflation, it is straightforward to use the IS equation, and the interest rate parity and purchasing power parity relationships to solve for the response of the exchange rate under discretion. The response of the nominal exchange rate at time t+j to an , equal to -1 at time t (i.e., a unit adverse supply shock) is giv en by: 10 For the same set of parameters, b * , the OSCR-following central bank's response to the shock, will be less than the b under discretion, an effect referred to "stabilization bias." See Svensson (1997) .
6
The first term, which comes from the interest rate differential, tends to increase the exchange rate, reflecting the increase in domestic interest rates used to combat inflation. The second term captures the shock's long-run effect on the price level. The net effect could go either way in a given period, depending on the strength of the initial policy response versus the long-run price-level implications.
Over time, however, the interest rate effects die out, so in the long run, an adverse supply shock leads to a depreciation.
This exchange rate response is characterized by the tradeoff between short-run and long-run exchange rate stabilization alluded to earlier. As 8, the weight on output stabilization falls (the central bank becomes more "conservative"), b and c (the central bank's degree of accommodation)
shrink. This reduces the supply shocks' effect on the long-run exchange rate, because the disinflation is greater and faster, but increases the short-run volatility through increasing the interest rate differential. In the limiting case of 8=0 (the "inflation nutter"), there is no long-run effect, but the short-run effect is maximized.
If the central bank can commit to a constant rate of expected inflation, the inflation bias problems associated with discretion disappear. King (1997) refers to this as the "optimal statecontingent rule," and argues that a properly-implemented inflation targeting policy can move the monetary authority in this direction. The central bank is believed to anchor inflation expectations, and so is not punished for its deviations.
In this case, the monetary authority creates inflation only in the period of the shock:
. 10 The response of the nominal exchange rate to a unit adverse supply shock would then be:
11 Arguments for the benefits of transparency, in terms of movement towards the OSCR and therefore to a better outcome of the central bank's time-inconsistency dilemma on average and in response to supply shocks, are given in the preceding section and in Kuttner and Posen (1999) . For broader discussions of the merits of transparency, in terms of democratic legitimacy, reduced market uncertainty, and improved central bank behavior, see inter alia King (1997) , Blinder (1998) , .
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The main difference between this exchange rate response and that under discretion is the lack of terms involving the coefficient describing the degree of state-contingent inflation bias, c. The lack of these terms means that the long-run effect of a supply shock on the price level and the PPP exchange rate is smaller. Furthermore, the absence of an inflation premium in the nominal interest rate implies smaller interes t rate differen tials, and attenuated short-run exchan ge rate volatility.
To summarize, when faced with supply shocks that entail a tradeoff between output and inflation stabilization, central banks can differ in their response to those shocks, and in the markets' response to them. Compared to the pure discretionary case, a "conservative" monetary policy can stabilize inflation and the long-run nominal exchange rate, but at the expense of introducing greater short-term volatility into the nominal (and real) exchange rate. In the limiting "inflation nutter" case (of no weight on output stabilization goals), inflation shocks have no long-run effect on inflation or even the nominal exchange rate, but maximum short-run effect on the volatility of the exchange rate.
Following the OSCR through transparently anchoring inflation expectations, however, produces a more stable exchan ge rate in both the short-and long-run relative to a discretionary po licy.
A FUNCTIONAL MEASURE OF TRANSPARENCY

IN THE G3 CENTRAL BANKS
While the path to central bank conservatism is well known (and increasingly well trod), the means to the OSCR is less widely recognized. As asserted in King (1997) , a transparent monetary policy-interpreted in practice as inflation targeting-grants the central bank the credibility and flexibility characterizing the OSCR. Transparency has become a central bank watchword in recent years, and it is not disingenuous to claim that most people know it when they see it practiced.
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Designing a more objectively reproducible measure of monetary transparency, however, requires a bit more rigor in classification. Following the discussion in Posen (1999) , it is possible to characterize the elements of monetary transparency as they relate to parts of the central bank's 12 As Friedman (1997) states, "Central bank purchases and sales of securities, the resulting changes in bank reserves, and fluctuations in the relevant short-term interest rate are all known data not long after the fact. But few central banks make clear -genuinely clear -just why they have chosen the actions they have taken." Similarly, Bomfim and Reinhart (2000) distinguish between announcements of monetary policy decisions in general and those which explain as well why the move was made. In theory, if the public and markets are given three or even two of these, and we assume markets have equivalent information to the cent ral bank about the econ omy, and that the central bank engages in optimizing behavior, the remainder can be derived. In practice, however, such backwards induction is unlikely to be successfully undertaken, or fully trusted by those who undertake it. Thus, there is room for the central bank to disclose (make transparent) its views on each aspect of the control problem. For such transparency to work, the central bank has to not only announce these as numbers, but provide sufficient explanation to grant understanding of the numbers' significance.
12
So this gives us four potential disclosures with which, by whether or not they are provided, to eval uate cen tral banks' transpare ncy:
• A public numerical long-r un go al for monetary policy; significantly from a reaction function (for example, a "Taylor rule") estimated on its past behavior, and whether it ackn owledge s that there was a con scious deviation from systematic policy.
18 Laubach and Posen (1997) goes through the Bundesbank's institutional framework in detail. Neumann (1997) comes to many of the same conclusi ons in more summary form.
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The Bundesbank was extremely stable in institutional transparency over the period 1975-1998. 18 From the time of the first monetary target, the Bundesbank annually announced the inflation goal (usually, but importantly not always, 2 percent) which underlay its quantity equation derivation of the year's monetary targets. Moreover, on several occasions when meeting the monetary target would have come into conflict with meeting the inflation goal, the inflation goal was pursued first and was publicly acknowledged to have been. On the two occasions when inflation was deemed likely to diverge noticeably from the goal for an extended period-following the 1979 oil shock, and after German monetary unification in 1990-the Bundesbank used its definition of "price stability" to point to a public long-run target. In terms of reporting, the Bundesbank was consistent in producing a Monthly Report which amassed a great deal of information beyond simply tracking the monetary aggregates, along with explanatory articles about issues in the German economy. The
Report gave general indications of the likely direction of monetary policy, as fiscal, external, and labor market developments unfolded, but did not ever give strict forecasts for inflation. The
Bundesbank did, however, publish its model of the economy in complete but highly technical form.
Finally on the matter of ex post evaluation, the Bundesbank was scrupulously transparent, using the occasion of the annual setting of monetary growth targets to track not only how well it did in meeting those intermediate targets, but also in meeting the inflation goal, and explaining deviations from the targets in terms of specific shocks.
In terms of transparency in discretion, the Bundesbank's record is also consistent. To illustrate from the two major instances of potential inflationary pressures mentioned, in the episode of the second oil shock, the Bundesbank made clear that it would be more gradual than usual in disinflating, and even gave a path for the intended rate of deflation (moving its "Unavoidable Rate of Inflation" up to 4 percent in 1980 and bringing it down slowly until declaring victory in 1986).
In the instance of monetary unification, the Bundesbank made clear that it was primarily concerned with inflation pass-through, and had to essentially ignore initial money demand shocks, and (perhaps as a result) found that neither was as large as expected. accompanied by a brief statement of the rationale for the move. While discount rate changes had always been announced w ith pres s releases, they too began to be accompanied by explanatory statements.
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It is in terms of ex post evaluation of shocks and outcomes that the Federal Reserve remains least transparent. While the Chairman does repo rt twice year ly to Congres s ahead o f the HumphreyHawkins hearings, and is in that sense formally accountable, policy's contribution to macroeconomic performance vis à vis that of exogenous shocks is not assessed. The lack of an explicit goal with which to benchmark performance makes such an assessment all the more difficult. Similarly, the Federal Reserve has often deviated from its "normal" response to macroeconomic developments (specified, e.g., by a " Taylor it is difficult to discern a consistent major role for exchange rates in J apan ese m onetary policy, though there certainly were occasional interventions.) After April 1987, and the G-7 agreements at that time, monetary policy appears to have s hifted between vari ous goal s, without a clearl yarticulated rationale for those shifts. For a time, the proximate and stated goals were domestic demand growth linked with a decline in the value of the dollar, but these were replaced by a focus on asset prices starting in June 1989, a shift which was confirmed by the incoming BoJ Governor 20 See Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Jinushi, Kuroki and Miyao (2000) for detailed assessments of the changes in, and unsystematic behavior of, BoJ monetary policy in the 1990s. Starting in January 1998, essentially beyond the end of our data set for this paper's analyses, the BoJ did increase its institutional transparency in line with its impending independence. Despite a clarification of mandate-to price stability in the long-run, with concern for financial stability as required-and new efforts to release minutes and other information, a lack of transparency in discretion has beset Japanese monetary policy since mid-1998. See Mikitani and Posen, eds., (2000) for details. 14 Mieno in December 1989. After the bubble burst, the BoJ gradually switched to a limited reflationary strategy, followed by direct efforts to keep the payment system afloat in 1996-1998. 20 In terms of the second criterion for institutional transparency, the publication of a regularly updated description of the Bank's model of the economy and estimates of the effect of monetary policy, the BoJ was similar to the Federal Reserve during the period examined. The BoJ did issue monthly reports of data on Japanese economic conditions, but stopped short of making specific forecasts. Changes in the monetary transmission mechanism were alluded to (e.g., that the collapse of the banking system in the 1990s undermined the effects of expansionary policy), but not quantified. There is no regular mechanism for reporting forecasts of macroeconomic variables such as inflation, and the goals and even their relative priority remain unspecified. Ex post evaluations were unstructured, and unlike the Federal Reserve, there was no commitment to report to the Diet on its performance. This had some logic so long as the Ministry of Finance (MoF) officially controlled policy, but MoF representatives were not held publicly accountable on a regular basis for monetary performance either.
As indicated by the discussion of the shifting goals of Japanese monetary policy in the 1990s, transparency in discretion was somewhat lacking. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) to buy commercial paper, keep the discount rate low, and the like, were well and explicitly explained as responses to the financial crisis (as was the government's failure to respond until October 1998), other instances were less clear. In particular, the slow pace of easing policy from 1992-95, and to a lesser degree the slow rise in interest rates in 1990-91, were only clear in direction: the pace, intermediate target or path to the goal, and the assessment of the effects of shocks were left 15 unspecified. This would lead one to expect increasing volatility in Japanese interest rate responses in the 1990s, which would in turn crea te additional exchange rate volatility.
QUANTIFYING THE MACROECONOMIC SOURCES OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY
It is worth beginning with an interesting stylized fact. The yen-dollar exchange rate has consistently shown significantly greater volatility than either of the other bilateral G3 exchange rates [see, e.g., Clarida (1999) ]. On any standard explanations of exchange rate volatility, this is an anomaly.
Macroeconomic differences between Japan and the United States, even if they were more unstable than those between Germany and the United States or Germany and Japan (which is by no means clear for the entire period), should not be the source of greater short-run volatility, given the literature's demonstrated unimportance of fundamentals. Both the United States and Japan had rising inflation in the 1970s, and declining inflation in the 1990s, relative to Germany's stable inflation rate, so the convergence on low inflation does not explain the pattern either. The market microstructures in terms of forex traders ' incent ives, information, liquidity, regul ation, technology, and so on, which are usually considered the primary underlying cause of exchange rate volatility, are identical across the G3 bilateral rates; the same firms, if not precisely the same traders, are dealing in all three currencies simultaneously.
By taking monetary transparency into account, however, there seems to be a way of making sense of this pattern: as argued in the previous section, the Bundesbank consistently exhibited greater institutional transparency than either the BoJ or the Federal Reserve since 1975. This would be consistent with there being smaller reactions of inflation expectations and interest rates to inflation surprises originating in the deutsche mark-zone. When one considers the additional fact that all three central banks pursued Tayloresque reaction functions over the 1975-1998 period (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) and table 2 below), and that this relative ranking of bilateral average volatility even holds including German unification, the ERM crisis, and their aftermath, it is more striking that 21 Laubach and Posen (1997) discuss the ability of the Bundesbank to anchor expectations even during reunification and the German monetary unification which followed. 16 the one apparent difference in monetary practice-the expectation anchoring effects of transparency-is consistent with this pattern.
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This gives us two reasons for focusing our empirical investigations on the deutsche mark-yen and deutsche mark-dollar exchange rates (and not the yen-dollar): First, since the Bundesbank's institutional transparency is essentially invariant over the 1975-1998 time period, but both the Federal Reserve's and the BoJ's transparency shift markedly, this lets us track the effect of changes in transparency. Second, since it is the deutsche mark cross-rates which were the subject of less direct political pressure over the period, studying the deutsche mark rates makes it more difficult to ascribe the influence of changes in transparency to an additional (unmeasured in this paper) source of shocks. i , normaliz ed so that the sum of the wei ghts equals unity.
Both measures tell identical stories. The volatility of the deutsche mark-dollar exchange rate has gradually declined by about one-quarter, from its peak of over 4 percent (standard deviation of monthly changes) to around 3 percent by 1994, where it has remained ever since. This is consistent with the measurement of increasing institutional transparency from Burns to Volcker to Greenspan, culminating in the additions to the Federal Reserve's institutional transparency in 1994. While the dollar has become more stable in recent years, the yen seems to have become quite a bit more volatile. From its peak near 5 percent in the late 1970s, the volatility of the deutsche mark-yen exchange rate declined to a nadir of around 2 percent in 1989. It subsequently increased to 3 percent, and surged to over 5 percent in 1998 as the yen appreciated sharply. This is also consistent with the measurement of decreasing transparency by the BoJ since 1987, after the Louvre Accord, and the increasing uncertainty about the priorities of the BoJ in responding to the challenges of the 1990s.
22 Which means that the emphasis here is on the systematic component of monetary policy, rather than on monetary policy "shocks" as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) or Faust and Rogers (2000) .
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Beyond the overall pattern, it is essential to ask to what extent do these changes in exchange rate volatility have roots in domestic inflation and interest rate surprises. These are the shocks whose prevalence and effects should relate to transparency, if transparency matters. If these shocks are important sources of volatility, the next question is whether the changes in the frequency and effect of these surprises sensibly track the trends in central bank transparency in detail, as they do in broad brush. Those are the questions we try to address in our econometric investigations of macroeconomic shocks and monetary policy as sources of exchange rate volatility.
Our main focus is on the effect of inflation shocks: how the exchange rate responds when inflation comes in higher than expected, taking systematic monetary policy response into account (and assuming that the markets and public do the same).
22 As discussed in section 1 above, for a more transparent central bank, the central bank's and the market's responses to an inflation shock should look more like the OSCR model, with lower inflation persistence, smaller inflation and exchange rate effects from a given inflation shock, and a smaller accompanying rise of interest rates.
A second question is the extent to which fluctuations in relative interest rates unrelated to inflation differentials can account for exchange rate movements. The size of the interest rate response is a noisy measure of markets' trust in the central bank's long-run commitment to its goal [see Kuttner and Posen (1999) ]. To answer both of these questions, it is useful to distinguish between inflation's long-run effect on the nominal exchange rate (via PPP), and its short-run effect from the interest rate differentials produced by the policy response to inflation.
The framework used for the analysis is a VAR involving the bilateral exchange rate (deutsche mark versus dollar or yen), the inflation differential (US or Japanese CPI inflation relative to West German), and the interest rate differential (the Federal Reserve funds or Gensaki rates relative to the German repo rate). The exchange rate is entered as a log difference, and cointegration between the exchange rate and relative price levels is not imposed; consequently, the real exchange rate not assumed to be stationary. To examine possible changes in the degree of monetary transparency and the hypothesized resulting changes in inflation dynamics, the model is estimated separately over two roughly equal periods, with the breakpoints in April 1987 for Japan and in July 1988 for the United 23 It is possible to argue for breaks in transparency for the BoJ in June 1989 (when interest rates began to rise to prick the bubble), and for the Federal Reserve in February 1989 (when Greenspan reiterated his definition of the price-stability goal in congressional hearings, and this was picked up by the major press), rather than these dates. As one would expect, this makes little difference to the results, especially for the United States, and the break points used in our investigations are statistically significant as they are. 24 Estimation ends in 1998:12 to avoid any possible break associated with Germany's adoption of the euro in 1999.
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States, as suggested by the institutional transparency changes discussed above. 23 For both pairs of countries, nine lags of monthly data from 1976 through 1998 are used in the estimation.
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Identifying the model and extracting well-defined inflation and interest rate "shocks" requires three assumptions. One corresponds to a version of the PPP condition: inflation shocks are assumed to have no long-run effect on the real exchange rate, i.e., that inflation shocks have the same effect on the price level differential and on the nominal exchange rate in the long run. The second restriction is that shocks to the interest rate differential also have no long-run effect on the real exchange rate. The third identifying assumption is simply that shocks to the interest rate differential have no contemporaneous (within the month) effect on the inflation differential.
Having specified the statistical model, there are two ways to draw out its implications for the behavior of the exchange rate. One is to invert the autoregression and compute the impulse response functions from the moving average representation in the usual way. This can be used to look for changes in the response of monetary policy and exchange rates to inflation shocks before and after break points in institutional transparency. By matching up the patterns of these shifts in impulse response functions with the predictions of our model in section 1, this is the first of our investigations.
This procedure, however, does not take advantage of the fact that the VAR can also be used to generate a forecast of future inflation and interest rate differentials which, according to purchasing power and uncovered interest rate parity, determine the exchange rate. The second procedure, then, is essentially to plug those forecasts into the solved-forward UIP relationship to determine the response of the exchange rate, constrained to satisfy the interest rate parity condition (and the 25 The restrictions implied by UIP are testable, alth ough we do not perfo rm those tests her e. In Clarida and Galí (1994) , the restrictions are rejected.
homogeneity implied by PPP).
25 As a complement to these historical decompositions, we also estimate policy reaction functions to look for shifts in central bank preferences, and identify deviations from the central bank's systematic response to macroeconomic conditions. We report the results from both methods for each country, first for the United States, then for Japan, below.
United States
Figure 2 displays the basic data on the deutsche mark-dollar bilateral rate, and the other components of the VAR. Looking at the bottom panel, the trend in the two countries' relative price levels matches up well with the general downward trend in the value of the dollar since 1972, indicating that our long-run restrictions are plausible. Figure 3 shows the estimated response of US inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates to an inflation shock of 1 percent. As suggested by the discussion above, a plausible breakpoint for the analysis is July 1988, when Alan Greenspan's testimony signaled a heightened clarity of focus on price stability. The top left panel of figure 3 shows that before 1988, the effects of shocks to the US/German inflation differential died out very grad ually. These effects, cumulated over a period of years, had large implications for relative price levels. As shown in the next panel down, the interest rate differential did not, however, rise as much as inflation, resulting in a fall in the real rate in the United States, relative to Germany, after an inflation shock in the United States relative to Germany.
This apparently accommodative monetary policy response in the United States prior to July 1988, similar to that of the discretionary case in our model, is reflected in the behavior of the exchange rate, shown in the bottom left panel of figure 3 . The dotted line shows the nominal exchange rate movement corresponding to the inflation shock's long-run effect on relative prices, which in this case is roughly 0.4 percent lower. The dashed line shows the path of the exchange rate constrained to satisfy UIP; after falling sharply in the in the month of the shock, it declines gradually towards the level implied by PPP. The unconstrained response, given by the dashed line, fa lls by a comparable amount on impact, but it subsequently overshoots by about 0.3 percent before converging (by assumption) to its PPP level.
26 This is just the standard historical decomposition of the nominal exchange rate in terms of past inflation shocks; see Doan (1992), 14-116. 27 This series is related to a multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition. To understand whether differences in these responses can be traced to the behavior of monetary policy, it is useful to examine monetary policy reaction functions, like those studied by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) . The top panel of table 2 presents forward-and backward-looking versions of a reaction function for the United States, allowing for a change in the coefficients on inflation and output after July 1988. What is striking in these results is the lack of any significant difference in terms of the relative weight on output and inflation goals between the two periods. The inflation coefficient (which is significant only in the forward-looking specification) is nearly unchanged, and the coefficient on real output (detrended log industrial production) increases slightl y.
28 Notice, however, that the standard error drops markedly, perhaps indicating more systematic policy in the second period. In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that the more subdued response of inflation and the nominal exchange rate to inflation shocks was obtained by an increase in conservatism. A decline in inflation persistence (an increase in the anchoring of inflation expectations) without a change in monetary policy goals is likely attributable to an increase in transparency -this is the potential additional degree of freedom for policymakers hypothesized about in our introduction.
Japan
As with the United States, figure 5 displays the basic data used in the VAR. Unlike in the case of the dollar, the yen's appreciation against the deutsche mark since 1980 appears largely unrelated to changes in the two countries' relative price levels. Figure 6 shows the response of inflation, interest rates, and the exchange rate to shocks to the Japanese-German inflation differential. The upper left-hand panel shows that prior to April 1987, shocks to the inflation differential displayed a fair amount of persistence (albeit not as much as the persistence of shocks to the United States-German differential). Nominal interest rates responded relatively gradually 22 (center-left panel), leading to a near-term decline in the real rate, followed by an increase after about six months. The unconstrained response of the nominal exchange rate (bottom-left panel) overshoots its PPP level somewhat, before appreciating; the path constrained by UIP shows an immediate decline followed by a further depreciation towards the PPP level.
As in the United States, there is much less persistence in the Japanese inflation differential after the breakpoint in the late-1980s; in fact, there is some tendency in the latter period for shocks to reverse themselves (top-right panel). In line with our model in section 1, this could be the result of either increased conservatism or transparency (movement towards the OSCR). Despite the more muted behavior of inflation, the response of nominal rates is broadly similar across the two periods: There is somewhat more variation in the interest rate differential, and shocks to it account for a surprising amount of the movements in the deutsche mark-yen exchange rate post-1987. In the unconstrained estimate, rising rates in the late 1980s are associated with a rising yen, and falling 29 The share peaks at 14 percent at the 24-month horizon. Shocks to the interest rate differential actually contribute slightly more to the nominal exchange rate variance pre-1987 at the shorter 1-6 month horizon, presumably due to the high-frequency volatility of short-term interest rates. 30 Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000) find a similarly timed break in the BoJ's response function in 1987, and a similar move towards more strict pursuit of inflation goals.
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rates in the early 1990s with the yen's subsequent decline. As shown in table 1, shocks to the interest rate differential account for 10 percent of the nominal exchange rate variance at a 12-month horizon. 29 In this latter portion of the sample, the exchange rate appears to be unusually sensitive to interest rate shocks: A 1 percent shock to the differential generates a peak response of over 6.5 percent, far in excess of the 1.3 percent or so that would be consistent with uncovered interest rate parity, given the shock's impact on future interest rate differentials. This sizable magnitude might be attributable to the decline in discretionary transparency, as BoJ monetary policy became less systematic in the face of the challenges of the 1990s; given the limited room for maneuver of the Japanese near-zero instrument interest rate, every monetary policy move was scrutinized for its uncertain implications for exchange rate levels.
Finally, to better understand the factors affecting Japanese interest rates, we examine an estimated reaction function for the BoJ, displayed in the bottom panel of table 2. The results confirm a distinct shift in the conduct of monetary policy in the late 1980s. Prior to 1987, the BoJ's emphasis seems to have been on real activity: The coefficient on detrended output is large and significant, while even in the forward-looking specification, the coefficient on inflation is small, and has the wrong sign. After 1987, the inflation coefficient is large (implying a two-or three-to-one response of the interest rate), and the coefficient on IP is insignificant 30 . Both coefficients' changes are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In short, counter-inflationary conservatism markedly increased in Japanese monetary policy in the 1990s, and this added to short-run exchange rate volatility. 31 The new BoJ Act of 1998, and the BoJ's preparations for operational independence, did increase institutional dependency on two of our four criteria, but this takes place at the very end of our sample period (and arguably was accompanied by a decrease in transparency in discretion).
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WOULD INCREASED TRANSPARENCY MEANINGFULLY DIMINISH G3 EXCHANGE VOLATILITY?
The premise of this paper's investigations was that differences in transparency of monetary policy within the G3 could explain part of the variation over time in short-run exchange rate volatility. As set out in the model of section 1, a central bank which increases its transparency of monetary policy making can be thought of as moving from discretion towards the OSCR, thereby better anchoring inflation expectations, and decreasing its need to be aggressive in response to inflation surprises.
Working from a standard model of central bank goals under time-inconsistency, following Svensson (1997) and Kuttner and Posen (1999) , but adding a short-run UIP condition, and long-run PPP, it becomes clear that movements from discretion towards the OSCR will diminish exchange rate volatility, while increases in conservatism (i.e., the relative weight on inflation goals) without compensating i ncre ases in trans pare ncy will increas e that short-run volatility. yen-dollar exchange rate volatility was consistently higher than either of the deutsche mark bilateral 32 Future work using monte-carlo methods will give us standard error bands on the impulse response functions, allowing us to assess whether these changes are statistically significant. So, in practice as well as in prospect, increasing monetary transparency does offer an additional degree of freedom with which the G3 central banks can address short-run exchange rate volatility. As exemplified by the shift in the Federal Reserve transparency after 1988, without an increase in conservatism-and the Federal Reserve and the markets' response to inflation surprises after that-it is not necessary to change a central bank's macroeconomic priorities in order to better anchor expectations, and thereby diminish exchange rate volatility. In fact, for reasonable parameter values, transparency enhancement is more likely to be win-win than increasing conservatism, decreasing both inflation persistence and forex volatility. As illustrated by the experience of the BoJ after 1987, increasing conservatism is more likely to trade a drop in inflation persistence for an increase in exchange rate volatility. Transparency is independent of the "impossible trinity" tradeoff usually cited as a reason for the inability or unwillingness of major central banks to respond to volatility, as well as of the "fundamentals" which do not determine exchange rates (except to the extent that increased transparency improves inflation performance).
The magnitude of the impact of increased monetary transparency on G3 exchange rate volatility, however, remains open to question. There is no quantitative, cardinal, metric for transparenc y, and so no way of knowing how much stability is bought for a given increase. In the case of the United States, while there is certainly room for additional clarity, given the marked increases in the Federal Reserve's institutional transparency in 1988 and 1993-94, it is not evident how much the additional efforts will "buy" in terms of exchange rate stability. If the entire decline in deutsche mark-dollar volatility after 1988 were to be attributed to the Federal Reserve's increase in transparency-a binding but not outrageous upper-bound-over 1 percent of the initial 4 percent monthly standard deviation of would have been taken away by the efforts. A similar attribution for the rise in deutsche mark-yen volatility gives an upper bound of over 2 percent, but given the Japanese economic crisis, it is much less credible that the only major shift in policy or forex environment was the shift in BoJ transparency and preferences. Taking only half that amount as the effect of transparency, however, puts us back at the same estimate as that for the deutsche markdollar. The average amount by which the yen-dollar volatility exceeds either of the deutsche mark bilateral rates-which could be interpreted largely as the Bundesbank's relative transparency bonus, since there are no significant differences from the other two central banks in central bank independence or in monetary response functions for much of the period, let alone in structure of the foreign exchange markets-is also of a similar order of magnitude.
If these ballpark but consistent estimates of the benefits of transparency were correct, that would still leave more than two-thirds of the present monthly volatility, which would still swamp (and be unrelated to) the movement in underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The problem of G3 exchange rate volatility would not go away, nor should it so long as financial markets' microstructure is the source of it (see Rogoff 1999 ). Yet, assuming that part of the dislike for exchange rate volatility is generated by its extreme magnitudes, removing 20-30% of it would be significant for emerging markets and international businesses-especially since the means for so doing, increasing monetary transparency, increases political legitimacy without economic cost, and adds potentially significant economic benefits (such as diminished inflation persistence and passthrough).
Meanwhile, were all three of the G3 central banks to maximize their institutional transparen cy, say by moving to explicit inflation targeting frameworks in today's believed best practice for openness, there is likely to be even greater demand for transparency in discretion. The major central banks' explanations of deviations from systematic policy would no longer be compared against just their own published goals, forecasts and explanations, but also those of their peers.
While this framework thankfully would not constitute a fixed rule, such an institutionalization of transparency would seem to bode well for more disciplined, better understood, monetary policy. This disciplining of discretion might in turn imply still further decreases in exchange rate volatility beyond those to be expected from each of the G3 central banks becoming more transparent on their own. 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 -30 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 -30 Response of interest rate and exchange rate to a 1 percent inflation shock, Japan 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 -30 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 -30 Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for 11th-order serial correlation. The break date for the U.S. is July 1988, and for Japan it is April 1987. Data are monthly. The dependent variable for Japan is the 3-month Gensaki rate, for Germany it is the overnight call money rate. IP is detrended log industrial production; for Japan, the trend is allowed to change in January 1990. The inflation regressor in the "backward" specification is the lagged twelve-month inflation rate; in the "forward" specification, which is estimated via 2SLS, the regressor is the inflation rate over the coming twelve months. The instruments for the 2SLS regression consist of lagged inflation, IP, and the interest rate, and the same variables interacted with the post-breakpoint dummy.
